By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This booklet proposes an unique concept of epistemic justification that provides a brand new approach to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the speculation relies on a unique research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a manner of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation don't need to be justificatory while systemic deception may be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification has to be obtainable to the believer, whereas retaining the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is particular from, proof, rationality, and chance. It presents a unifying remedy of concerns significant to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the influence of good fortune on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical review of epistemological theories. There are extra functions to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technological know-how, and ethics.
The ebook will have interaction philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Additional info for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
I do not think it resolves this ambiguity to distinguish the justifiedness of firstorder beliefs from the justifiedness of second-order beliefs about the justifiedness of first-order beliefs. It does not help to say, for example, that a first-order belief is unjustified, although the second-order belief that the first-order belief is justified is justified. For, one’s justification for believing that a belief is justified would seem to justify the belief. It strains coherence to fault one as unjustified in believing what one is justified in believing justified.
In calling a belief “reliable”, I mean that it issues from a reliable process. Then a reliable belief may be false if conditions are abnormal. Note that normalcy is not a condition for the reliability of a method. Rather, it is a condition for a reliable method to be inerrant. It may seem natural to regard consulting my thermometer as an unreliable method at > +50◦ C, for it is not trustworthy at such temperatures. The best I can do to accommodate this intuition is to pronounce one’s reliance upon it mistaken.
One way emphasizes the acquisition of truth. Our method yields lots of truth and little falsity; in investing credence reliably, the preponderance of truth over falsity is high. 1 The other way emphasizes avoidance of error. While not infallible, reliably formed beliefs can be counted on rarely if ever to be false, 1 As I have noted, Goldman also applies the term ‘reliability’ to subjunctive conditions for knowledge (1976). Ernest Sosa and William Alston (1995) are further proponents of the probabilistic interpretation.